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The Arab Spring; A Reason to Reject Samuel Huntington's 

Clash of Civilizations 


Sohail louya 

William Jewell College - Oxford University - Westminister College 

In the post-9/11 world, Samuel Huntington's book, The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order attained an almost iconoclastic 
status and was presented almost as a prophetic text that described the nature 
of world politics. Huntington proposed that the globe was split into 
civilizational "zones” that demarked cultural identity, political ideology, and 
social understanding. In a modern world where these civilizations struggle for 
power, an inevitable "clash" would occur, mostly between the most powerful 
civilization's national moniker and the challenging civilization's counterpart. 
After 9/11, a new clash of civilization manifested, replacing the residual Cold 
War with a civilizational conflict between the Islamic world and the West - 
most specifically with the US, "Some argue that Islamist attacks represent a 
[new] transnational terrorism that differs in its timing, methods, lethality and 
underlying social origins from earlier Cold War-era leftist terrorism. Spurred 
by the Iranian revolution and post-Cold War international system in which the 
superpower rivalry was replaced by a new set of civilizational rivalries 
[Crenshaw & Robison].” 

Huntington's work seemed to anticipate this apparent clash and 
described the Islamic world as one that harbored resentment and an anti- 
democratic ethos. This mythology was long circulated as unquestionable 
truth, an accurate portrayal of the Middle East, the Arab world, and Islam. 
These assertions have come under a lot of scrutiny, but even more recently 
criticisms against Huntington's depiction of Islamic civilization have gained 
significant credence. With the Arab Spring, the world saw a grassroots, 
democratic wave catch fire in the Islamic world ignoring geopolitical 

boundaries and showing signs of a consortium of healthy, active civil societies. 

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In this essay, I will critically evaluate Samuel Huntington's 
assertions about Islamic civilization. Further, I will explain how the Arab 
Spring is articulated evidence of democracy's compatibility with Muslims. 

First, I will briefly outline Huntington's general outlook of global politics. In 
response to these assumptions, I will provide the analysis of other 
constructivist authors. Though there is an occasional overlapping consensus, 
these authors view the recent social, political, and economic trends differently 
in relation to America's role in the world. Most specifically, the distinctions in 
their perceptions regarding Islam require significant amounts of attention and 
analysis. Additionally, I will portray the perspectives regarding the Islamic 
civilization. To further my objective, I will refute Huntington's argument that 
that the Muslim world fosters an inherently violent culture. Providing a 
framework that rejects Huntington's Orientalist worldview will help provide a 
foundation to explain the Arab Spring, its impact, and how Islamic political 
and civil society coincides with democratic values. 

Huntington states that after the fall of the Soviet Union, "the most 
important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or 
economic. They are cultural.” Establishing the identity of a people or a nation 
emerges through civilization-based grouping, the broadest means of 
identification, discerned by common cultural factors including "language, 
history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification 
of people.” Ultimately, Huntington argues that these differences in civilizations 
will determine where conflicts arise. These major civilizations are Sinic, 
Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, Latin American, and African. 
Moreover, the world is entering an era where worldwide politics is both 
multipolar and multicivilizational and that modernization will not morph 
states to utilize a Western paradigm. Westerners dangerously believe in the 
universality of their culture. Also, Huntington's fundamental argument is 
concerned with the role of the Western world, most specifically the United 
States, where he believes the civilization is in relative decline. In order to keep 

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the US from falling from its position of relevancy, he argues that there needs 
to be an emphasis in embracing the West's uniqueness and to protect it from 
external threats. 

Fareed Zakaria, on the other hand, strongly rejects that there is a 
decline of the West and that the seeming attenuation is an unfair comparison 
to its success in the past. “We are now living through the. ..great power shift of 
the modern era. It could be called the 'rise of the rest,'” says Zakaria. Markets 
of other nations are booming and the great status symbols of wealth are no 
longer solely in the US. He argues that China and India are becoming new 
world powers and that the US must accept and adapt to the new actors' 
positions internationally in order maintain its prominence. While the US is 
superior in terms of military strength, "every other dimension - industrial, 
financial, educational, social, cultural - the distribution of power is shifting, 
moving away from American dominance,” he explains. This rise of the West is 
particularly significant in understanding how these waves of democracy 
operate. In the Middle East, the universality of human rights and democracy 
captured the ethos of people across geopolitical borders ushering in a new 
globalized era in international relations. 

In regards to the Muslim world, Huntington argues that the most direct 
clash of civilizations pits the West against Islam. He cites a number of reasons 
as to why this conflict occurs, notably that the increased population bulge of 
Muslim youth is disproportionate to the amount of opportunity available. This 
imbalance has proved advantageous to terrorist organizations seeking to 
recruit new members from the pool of disaffected youngsters. Also, the 
revitalized values of Muslim society have created a post-colonial sentiment 
that has rejected the Western framework, regarding it as neo-imperial. 
Additionally, Huntington states that "the increasing contact 
between. ..Muslims and Westerns stimulate in each a new sense of their own 
identity and how it differs from that of the other," bifurcating the civilizations 
and augmenting already existing conflicts. 

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The most important and most controversial contention that Huntington 
makes is that he regards Islam as inherently violent and antithetical to peace. 
He argues that this is true for a number of reasons. First, Islam puts heavy 
emphasis on violence and their religious text lacks serious and substantial 
condemnation of bloodshed. Second, Muslims have established a legacy of 
expansion that still carries on; third, there are features of Islam that prevent 
assimilation and harmony with other civilizations. Fourth, there is a jockeying 
for power between Islamic nations seeking to emerge as the core state; a 
power vacuum that furthers instability. Finally, he illustrates the problem of 
the lopsided demographic of youth in the Muslim world inciting more 
volatility. 

These observations of Islam deserve special attention and 
understanding. These are the most damning arguments Huntington makes to 
explain the indigestibility of Muslims in democracies and democracy's 
incompatibility with Political Islam. It is crucial to understand that 
Huntington's worldview of Islam is grossly mischaracterized and conflates 
Islamic fundamentalism with the interpretations most Muslims employ 
ideologically. 

In terms of the comparison of violence present in Western religions and 
Islam, one can make a convincingly sound argument that Islam is less textually 
violent that Christianity. As religious scholar Karen Anderson points out, 
"There is far more violence in the Bible than in the Qur'an; the idea that Islam 
imposed itself by the sword is a Western fiction, fabricated during the time of 
the Crusades when, in fact, it was Western Christians who were fighting brutal 
holy wars against Islam." With thorough examination it is easy to spot the 
prevalence of holy decrees of violence and bloodshed in the Bible, "The Bible 
contains far more verses praising or urging bloodshed than does the Koran, 
and biblical violence is often far more extreme, and marked by more 
indiscriminate savagery [Jenkins].” In the Old Testament, the conquest of 
Canaan by the Hebrews has been a story that often displays the violent nature 

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of the origins of Judeo-Christian undertakings. Even Joshua had "conquered 
the land" and left nothing behind as a sort of ethnic cleansing. In terms of 
evaluating religious texts, Judaism and Christianity have far more 
encouragement of violence and as Jenkins describes, "deserve the utmost 
condemnation as religions of savagery [Jenkins]." 

While it is true that are a compendium of verses in the Quran that cite 
violence, there is a clear just war theory that Muhammad illustrates in the 
Islamic conception of jihad. These rules of war, as theologian Seyyed Nasr 
maintains, are used to limit the brutality rather than to augment it, "Although 
defense of oneself, one's homeland, and one's religion and overcoming of 
oppression remain religious duties, the regulations of warfare, especially the 
protection of the innocent. ..and dealing with the enemy in justice, also remain 
part and parcel of the religion." 

Islam as a religion is very much based in the recitations of God through 
Muhammad as a proxy. It was his obligation to promulgate the word of God 
throughout the region, specifically Mecca. The purpose of fleeing to Medina 
and arriving back to Mecca with the capabilities of forcibly quashing hostile 
forces is straightforwardly explained. It was simply a means to an end; 
burdened with the responsibility to spread the messages of the Divine, it was 
only sensible for Muhammad to preserve his own life and find a way to 
reclaim Mecca as the holy center of Islam. 

Moreover, it is important to add context to the cultural setting of Arabia 
in the 8 th century. Military conflict was not unusual; the Arab region was strife 
with tribal quarrels and warring that established a norm of political conduct. 
Muhammad was purely a man of his time, "The raiding party was a 
characteristic feature of life in Arabia in Muhammad's time, so that his 
attempt to stop the Meccan caravan that resulted in the battle of Badr was 
accepted by all as customary and within his rights. ..and the majority of the 

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other expeditions he led did not make contact with any enemy tribe but were 
largely demonstrations to the neighboring Bedouin tribes of his growing 
power (Welch, etc].” This seems to edify the actions of Muhammad as being 
justified to bring about his duty to God, as working within the open context of 
his cultural setting, and also as being limited in his use of force. 

Furthermore, the reality of the discourses currently in Islam contrasts 
staggeringly to that of Huntington's perspective. Making a seemingly 
audacious claim, Zakaria argues that the threat of Islamic extremism is highly 
inflated. Though the catastrophes of September 11, 2001 and other ensuing 
terror attacks in Europe and Southeast Asia are nothing short of appalling, the 
casualties have been relatively limited. More importantly, the effectiveness of 
the War on Terror has frozen terrorist networks' financial mobility, crippling 
their capacities to instigate more attacks. The military operations against such 
organizations have also reduced terrorism in the Middle East to nothing more 
than rhetorically violent communications campaign. 

In addition, the support for terror organizations is tremendously low 
and unpopular, Zakaria explains that "no society looks with admiration and 
envy on the fundamentalist Islamic model. ..it presents no competition to the 
Western-originated model of modernity that countries across the world are 
embracing." Most importantly, rouge terror-sponsoring nations simply do not 
possess the economic capabilities to supply severely damaging acts to the 
West. 


Though both are compelling authors and constructivists, Zakaria does a 
much better job accurately analyzing the Muslim world. Huntington seems to 
believe that extremism is a condition of the inherently violent nature of Islam 
and that conflict between Muslims and the West is inevitable. It can be 
extrapolated from Zakaria's work that he does not believe that there is an 
intrinsic antagonistic factor to Islam. Rather, he states that terrorism is an 
extreme fringe of the civilization that is ineffective and rejected in its 

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indigenous setting. Zakaria is correct in his observations that there is a push 
to modernize the Muslim world and that it will increase the compatibility of 
the civilization with the West. 

Huntington goes through a painstaking assessment to arrive at the 
conclusion that Islam is an inherently violent and disruptive civilization. He 
states that during a period of the 1990s, fifteen of twenty intercivilization 
wars took place between the Islamic civilization and another culture. He also 
cites where, "nine of twelve intercivilizational conflicts were between Muslims 
and non-Muslims, and Muslims were once again fighting more wars than 
people from any other civilization.” He even indicates that there are 
intracivilizational conflicts occurring between Muslims, further validating his 
claim of Islam’s innate aggression. However, many of the observations 
Huntington mentions cannot be justifiably used to prove Muslim violence. In 
the example of Kosovo and the Xinjiang providence in China, Huntington is 
quick to note the conflict occurring, but not its origins. These were acts of 
genocide against Muslims that created a reactive wave of violence against 
their oppressors. These observations make it very difficult to identify the 
Muslims as the aggressors. The same case can be argued on behalf of Palestine 
and Chechnya; repression of the Islamic people has aroused violent conflict 
but there is nothing to indicate hostility as part of the nature of the civilization 
itself. 


Another argument Huntington asserts is that there is a noticeable lack 
of Islamic scripture that promotes peace and deprecates violence. This is 
utterly untrue; the Qur'an makes great strides to advance the Muslim 
aspiration of peace and harmony to followers of other religions. It is also 
imperative to note the current phenomena of the Islamic Reformation, a 
phraseology given by Islamic intellectual Reza Aslan to explain the current 
juxtaposition Islam is faced with. Drawing from many parallels to the 
Christian Reformation, Aslan describes this reformation as inciting terrifying 
instability that has resulted from internal ideological discourse over the true 

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interpretations of Islam. Violence may erupt, but the horrifying precedent of 
the Christian Reformation anticipates these conflicts. 

Also, there is also no core school of Islamic interpretation that 
dominates Muslim thought space. This is an issue that incites equally as much 
divergence as the argument that violence is brought by Islam lacking a 
stabilizing core state; Wahbbism and its followers have already brought about 
bloody conflicts with more moderate understandings of Islam. Internal and 
external conflict arises from these competing religious interpretations vying 
for control. Empirically, this violence is not a unique characteristic of Islam, 
but is a quality of faith-based collective identities in general. 

Huntington relies on rhetoric from Islamic extremists such as Osama bin 
Laden who not only had limited appeal to Muslims but also lacked clerical 
authority and rejected the traditional theological order of Muslim schools. A 
rogue self-proclaimed Muslim symbol posing as a cleric issuing fatwas 
without the necessary credentials is not the proper representation of the 
Islamic civilization. Rather, al-Qaeda and the like speak in dualistic orotundity 
for political motives. Michael Dunn explained that this concept of a cosmic war 
is the prevailing ideology of conservatives for both civilizations, Islamic 
fundamentalist and neo-conservatives in the West alike, "Clearly, the creation 
of a discourse that portrays 'Islam' on the one hand and 'the West' on the 
other is... beneficial to the leaders of Islamic militant groups.” Thus, 
continuing this faulty rhetoric further augments this divide threatening to 
bring mass-levels violence with it. 

The Arab Spring's origins in late 2010 seem to confirm Zakaria's 
assertions that there is a "rise of the rest” and deny Huntington's reliance on 
cultural relativism. American hegemony has faded marginally and has ended 
the monopoly on democratic reform. Ben Ali's fall in Tunisia manifested the 
Arab civil spirit that human rights and democracy are not Western values but 

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rather, universal ones that bring freedom, liberty, and opportunity for human 
development. Protesters at Tahrir Square were not advancing a Western 
agenda, rather they were calling for their agency within their respective Arab 
identity, "Those fighting for democracy do not feel they are adopting Western 
values but rather that they are calling for the application of universally shared 
values that are compatible with their cultural and religious traditions. Arab 
democratic revolutionaries say they will resist the imposition of any cultural 
or political agenda by the West in the name of justice and dignity. This is one 
of the many signs that we are entering a post-Western era (de Vasconcelos]." 

Theorist Edward Said's works offered the most credible critiques to 
authors like Bernard Lewis and Huntington. His central thesis of Orientalism 
extended to the concept of a cosmic battle between religion and cultural 
identity, mostly by exposing that these worldviews ignore the complexity of 
political scenes. The Middle East has been and will more than likely continue 
to be rife with multiple political entities jockeying for power that represent an 
even larger array of peoples with a multitude of sub-cultures and identities. 

Said states that Huntington did not have "much time to spare for the 
internal dynamics and plurality of every civilization or for the fact that the 
major contest in most modern cultures concerns the definition or 
interpretation of each culture, or for the unattractive possibility that a great 
deal of demagogy and downright ignorance is involved in presuming to speak 
for a whole religion or civilization. No, the West is the West, and Islam, Islam." 
In a perfectly parsimonious scathing of Huntington, Said reveals the 
shortcomings of a clash of civilizations paradigm: it ignores the tremendously 
unusual history and formation of Middle Eastern states. 

Political Islam is often blamed for the lack of democratic initiative in 
Muslim countries. Islamic values incorporated into the political sphere has 
drawn criticism as being the antipode to democracy, "There has been the 

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tendency in the West to presume that Islam is antithetical to the process of 
modernization. ..has often led to the automatic assumption that Islam and 
democracy. ..are incompatible (Abootalebi, 67].” 

These denigrations are empirically misleading. Muslim nations such 
as Turkey and Indonesia have overwhelming predominately Islamic 
majorities and yet are still able to function as a fairly liberal democracy. The 
common myth that Islam hinders democratic change has no warrant yet is 
often considered as a truism in many political discourses. The problems of 
instituting a democracy in a Muslim nation seem to be a specific problem 
plaguing the Middle East. 

The political jockeying for power in the established states in the Middle 
East has several problems that have made democracy building a very difficult 
task. Most importantly, the economic stagnation, and often redistribution of 
land, eroded the wealthier and middle classes to unite regardless of sectarian 
divide and establish a vanguard elite to bring progression and liberalization to 
the region, "Imperial rule discouraged the emergence of an independent 
merchant bourgeoisie that might have united the cities to demand such 
representation. In obstructing the emergence of private property in land until 
the nineteenth century, the state discouraged the consolidation of a landed 
aristocracy, an advance beyond tribal fragmentation crucial to state-society 
linkage [Hinnebusch].” If a wealthy class were established, the financial 
accumulation would have translated to political leverage and greatly impact 
public policy. With the constant reallocation of property, this seemingly 
egalitarian move made public opinion ineffective in convincing politicians to 
cater to the masses. 

Also, the diversity of ethnic, religious, and tribal groups within each 
state made their specific social practices the foremost concern in their 
paradigm of identity. The inability to integrate into a single, cohesive 

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population left states weak and unable to function in a conventional Western- 
formatted state, "The existence of a civil society implies a shared sense of 
identity, by means of, at least, tacit agreement over the rough boundaries of 
the political unit. In a word, a sense of citizenship, with associated rights and 
responsibilities. ..the individual in civil society is granted rights by the state, 
but, in return, acquires duties to the state [Norton].” There was little success 
in convincing minority groups with had strong ties to their distinctive identity 
to fuse in a common citizenship with a nation that effectively required 
adhering to a new social institution's agenda. 

States that were lucky enough to overcome some those obstacles still 
had a very fragile civil society in the 20 th century due to the inability for 
differing political agendas and ideologies to be tolerated by opposition. The 
lack of respect was often a result of fear that an alternative group would be 
dictating the political climate permanently which resulted in a radically 
unstable state-established institution. Norton explains, "Civil society is more 
than an admixture of various forms of association, it also refers to a quality- 
civility-without which the milieu consists of feuding factions. Civility implies 
the willingness of individuals to accept disparate political views and social 
attitudes. Thus, a robust civil society is more than membership lists, public 
charters, and manifestoes, [it is] the underpinning of democracy [Norton].” 
The constant struggle to control the political arena rather than compromise 
and work with multiple entities created a dangerous precedent of attempting 
to take extra-judicial measures to secure political interests. 

These political implications are exactly the peculiar complexities of 
the Arab region that have proven to be the true obstacles to democracy in 
parts of the Muslim world, not Islam. In many ways Political Islam harbors 
inherently democratic messages and quelled the problems of sub-state 
identities to foster a civil society of consensus building. The unique troubles of 
the Middle East have to deal, as aforementioned, with the repercussions of 

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colonialism, “But it was not until the 20 th century when the advent of Western 
domination and colonialism forced religious authorities to seriously think 
about the implications for Muslims of the Western military, economic, 
technological, and maybe even ideological superiority [63].” The restructuring 
of Islamic rhetoric to enable political movements was a calculated response to 
the damage inflicted to the region and was utilized as a common language and 
a regional solution. 

There is a plethora of evidence that many interpretations of Islam are 
not only harmonious with democracy, but rather call for a strict adherence to 
several democratic principles. In fact, the ability for imams and other religious 
figures to hold political offices require recognition of democratic values such 
as majority rule, "It has been argued that political leadership in Islam is 
intended by God to be based on popular sovereignty and no religious 
authority, including Prophet Mohammed, is exempt from popular will [66].” 
Moreover, it is important to note than often, Islam is used as a counter- 
ideology to the state if it happens to be secular. For example, Hinnebusch 
explains that the secular Ba'athist Party in Syria was opposed by most Islamic 
institutions in Damascus. Considering the party to be socialist, the imams 
emphasized the importance of free-market economics while creating a wider 
pluralist base and helped bring more democratic change to Syria. The same 
can be said for Iraq as well; considering it was a nation the United States 
considered be a direct threat to democracy in the region, the Ba’athist of 
Sadaam Hussein were undeniably secular. 

To further the irony of the West, the foreign policy agenda toward the 
Middle East was rather counter-intuitive to the rhetoric that was espoused 
from American political mouthpieces. The justification for intervention in Iraq 
quickly shifted to democracy promotion as an effective tool in the War on 
Terror. After US forces uncovered that weapons of mass destruction were not 
present in Baghdad, Bush's neo-conservatives contended that liberal 

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democracy in Iraq would trigger a wave of democracy in the Middle East 
eliminating terror groups in the process. In practice however, the case for 
democratization as a pretext for war seemed contrary to American aid and 
support for regimes in the region that were despotic and totalitarian. This 
paradox strongly diluted the Western voices clamoring for democracy in the 
Middle East, "The social engineering of democratic processes was further 
aggravated by the pursuit of what were mutually exclusive goals: the 
intervention in Iraq was undertaken in the name of democracy and spreading 
democracy to the Arab world, but the fight against terrorism was undertaken 
in cooperation with authoritarian regimes and in connivance with their 
repressive anti- democratic methods (de Vasconcelos]." 

The Arab Spring was the result of revolutionary fervor and a demand 
for improved living conditions both materialistically and in terms of liberty. It 
culminated from a grassroots level and not from engaging reforms 
encouraged from the West or from social pressures of the international 
community and it certainly did not come from American interests. Quite the 
opposite is true - Arab dictators clung to their power while continuing to 
receive support from the United States, a residual affect of the Bush-era 
strategy for eradicating terror. 

Regardless, Islamic political groups were largely responsible for the 
Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, and currently Syria. They have surfaced as the 
only plausible alternative to the current regimes stems from their wide base, 
organization, and popular messages of overthrowing oppressive regimes. 
Logically it follows that they have enjoyed a good amount of electoral success 
and it is a safe assertion to believe this tendency will continue for some time. 
With the fostering of a unified civil society recognizing a single state identity, 
the challenges of the democratic political project are still bitterly present. 
Consensus building between political factions is as important as the 
implementation of a democratic constitution. With creating an environment 

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that fosters political growth, all parties must respect the game that is 
democracy rather than abuse short-lived power to promote a particular 
agenda. The cooperation that's necessary for polar political parties is an 
essentially important factor for the health of emerging democracies, "The 
consensus between liberals and Islamists is essential for the success of the 
democratic transition and for drafting a democratic constitution, one that 
reflects the will of the whole 'people' and not just the views of a small 
majority. That is what other experiences of democratic transitions suggest (de 
Vasconcelos].'' Moderation on public policy is typically the condition that best 
fosters social development and benefits the greatest range of people. 

The real challenge that confronts the Middle East is the intermingling of 
political interests from a variety of angles and philosophies. With these 
internal issues about the authority of Islam, the collective feeling of despair 
brought on by colonialism has had the Muslim world struggling with the 
issues of modernity. In attempts to bring Pan-Islamic movements as the 
alternative to the Western concept of the state, many Western critics reduce 
Islam to an entity that is centered on politics and hegemony. These historic 
cultural fault lines have led to the perception of conflict with the West, 
resulted in even more misunderstanding of Islam. Rather, Islam is in an 
extraordinary and momentous period that will dictate its future as it grapples 
with the issues of modernity and temporal pluralism. The Arab Spring is the 
greatest articulated evidence that Islamic civilization is able to digest 
democracy despite its tumultuous and unusual history. Though the 
implications of how this will alter the Middle East's strategic equation are 
unclear, it can be deduced that democracy's message has championed itself as 
one that is universal and culturally compatible. The Arab Spring also confirms 
what many have advanced for a decade: we are living in a post-Western world 
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Works Cited 

Abootalebi, Ali. Islam and Democracy . New York: Garland Pub, 2000. 

Norton, Augustus. " The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East Author(s]”: 
Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1993], pp. 205-216 
Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: 

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328567Accessed: 18/11/2009 18:30 
Aslan, Reza. No god but God: The Origins, Evolutions, and Future of Islam. New 
York, NY: Random House, 2005. 

Bistrich , Andrea. "Discovering the common grounds of world religions," 
interview 

with Karen Armstrong, Share International, Sept. 2007, pp. 19-22. 
Hinnebusch, Raymond A. "State and Civil Society in Syria Author(s]”: Source: 
Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1993], pp. 243-257 
Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: 

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328570Accessed: 19/11/2009 21:41 
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2003. 

Kamrava, Mehran. Understanding Comparative Politics . New York: Routledge, 
1996. 

Nasr, Seyyed. The Heart of Islam . San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2004. 
Said, Edward W. "The Clash of Ignorance,” The Nation, 22 October 2001. 
Vasconcelos, Alvaro, and Pierre Vimont. Listening to Unfamiliar Voices: The 
Arab Democratic Wave. Paris: European Union Institute for Security 
Studies, 2012. Print. 

Welch, Alford T., Ahmad S. Moussalli, Gordon D. Newby, Ahmad Moussalli 
Source: The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. 

http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0550? hi=2& pos= 

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Zakaria,Fareed. The Post-American World. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co, 
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